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Abstract: 
During the turbulent 1970s and 1980s the Bundesbank established an outstanding reputation in the 
world of central banking. Germany achieved a high degree of domestic stability and provided safe 
haven for investors in times of turmoil in the international financial system. Eventually the 
Bundesbank provided the role model for the European Central Bank. Hence, we examine an episode 
of lasting importance in European monetary history. The purpose of this paper is to highlight how the 
Bundesbank monetary policy strategy contributed to this success. We analyze the strategy as it was 
conceived, communicated and refined by the Bundesbank itself. We propose a theoretical framework 
(following Söderström, 2005) where monetary targeting is interpreted, first and foremost, as a 
commitment device. In our setting, a monetary target helps anchoring inflation and inflation 
expectations. We derive an interest rate rule and show empirically that it approximates the way the 
Bundesbank conducted monetary policy over the period 1975-1998. We compare the Bundesbank's 
monetary policy rule with those of the FED and of the Bank of England. We find that the 
Bundesbank's policy reaction function was characterized by strong persistence of policy rates as well 
as a strong response to deviations of inflation from target and to the activity growth gap. In contrast, 
the response to the level of the output gap was not significant. In our empirical analysis we use real-
time data, as available to policy-makers at the time. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the German Bundesbank established its reputation 
as one of the most successful central banks in the world. Along with the Swiss National Bank, 
the Bundesbank was the first central bank to announce and pursue a strategy based on 
monetary targets after the breakdown of Bretton Woods. In this paper, we relate the 
Bundesbank success in maintaining price stability and in anchoring inflation expectations to 
its strategy. We examine the strategy as it was presented, refined and communicated by the 
Bundesbank itself. Our goal is to provide a historical account of the conduct of monetary 
policy, focusing especially on the first ten years of monetary targeting, from 1975 until the 
middle of the 1980s, when price stability was virtually reached in Germany. 
 
According to the Bundesbank Act the objective of monetary policy is to safeguard the 
currency. The Bundesbank has always interpreted its mandate as giving precedence to 
(domestic) price stability. It is, therefore, clear that monetary targets were intermediate 
targets. They were instrumental to achieving price stability. Helmut Schlesinger (1988) – as 
quoted in von Hagen (1995) - made the point crystal clear:  
 
"… the Bundesbank has never, since 1975, conducted a rigid policy geared at the money 
supply alone; all available information about financial markets and the development of the 
economy must be analyzed regularly … Furthermore, the Bundesbank had to check the 
consistency of her original monetary targets with the ultimate policy goals." 
 
Moreover, the Bundesbank’s operational framework for monetary policy implementation 
implied that the first step in the transmission mechanism was the control over a money market 
interest rate. Thus, in this paper, we characterize the Bundesbank’s monetary policy strategy 
through an interest rate rule in the tradition of Taylor (1993, 1999), modified to take account 
of the implications of monetary targeting for the Bundesbank’s interest rate decisions. The 
issue has already been repeatedly considered in the literature (e.g. Clarida et al., 1998, 
Gerberding et al., 2005). 
   2
The central role of monetary policy in anchoring inflation and inflation expectations was 
recognized as crucial by the Bundesbank early on. Such concern is transparent in the 
mechanics of the derivation of the monetary target. From this viewpoint, central banking 
practice progressed ahead of theory's emphasis on credibility and reputation (as developed 
later in the work of Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon 1983a, 1983b).    
 
In the last fifteen years, the new neoclassical synthesis and new Keynesian models became 
the workhorse for the theory of monetary policy-making (see Woodford, 2003, and Galí, 
2008, for authoritative, book length, surveys).
1 These models rely on a Real Business Cycle 
core. They add on price setting by monopolistic competitive firms subject to some constraint 
or cost on price changes, leading to nominal stickiness. Another key feature is that economic 
agents form expectations in a forward-looking way, taking into account what they know about 
the central bank’s reaction function. Hence, despite their well-known limitations, these 
models provide a natural environment to discuss commitment, credibility and reputation (see, 
for example, Gaspar and Kashyap, 2007).  
 
Building on the modified loss function approach (pioneered by Rogoff, 1985), we will show  
in this paper how focusing on money growth helps to bring the conduct of monetary policy 
closer to optimal policy under commitment (thereby improving on the outcome under 
discretion). It does so by inducing a persistent, history-dependent response of policy rates to 
deviations of inflation and output from target. Therefore, it allows us to rationalize monetary 
targeting as a commitment device (here we follow the lead of Söderström, 2005). 
 
Inevitably, such stylized story does not do full justice to monetary targeting as practiced by 
the Bundesbank. Nevertheless, it does, in our view, help to interpret the historical evidence. 
Specifically, our stylized story suggests one mechanism through which monetary targeting 
provided a means to anchor inflation and inflation expectations. We derive an interest rate 
rule corresponding to this set-up and confront it with real-time data. We find that the interest 
rate rule implied by our model of monetary targeting captures the Bundesbank’s monetary 
policy actions well. We compare the policy pursued in Germany with those conducted by the 
FED and the Bank of England.  
                                                 
1 These models have also been actively used in policy-making institutions. Prominent examples are the ECB, the 
Board of Governors and the IMF. Relevant references are Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), Coenen et al. 
(2008), Christiano et al. (2008) Erceg et al. (2006), Edge, et al. (2007) and Bayoumi et al. (2004).   3
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide an overview of the relative 
performance of German monetary policy as compared with other industrialized countries. In 
section 3 we briefly describe institutions and history of monetary policy in Germany in the 
relevant period. We elucidate the concept of "pragmatic monetarism" and clarify the crucial 
role of the explicit derivation of the monetary target. In section 4 we introduce a simple 
macroeconomic framework based on the standard new Keynesian model. We derive a role for 
monetary targeting as a commitment devise. We obtain the instrument rule implied by our 
framework. In section 5 we estimate an interest rate rule, inspired by our theoretical analysis, 
using real time German data and compare the results with estimates for the US and the UK. In 
section 6 we conclude.   4
2. Brief overview of inflation developments in selected industrial countries 
in the period 1959-1998 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the German Bundesbank acquired a strong 
reputation for maintaining lower inflation rates than many other countries could. In this 
section we will look at the relevant stylized facts and put them into historical context, in 
particular from a monetary policy perspective. From a global view, the second half of the 20
th 
century was marked by three periods: by the system of Bretton Woods which lasted until 
1973, to be followed by the period of the “Great Inflation” until the end of the 1970s and 
subsequently by the period of “Great Moderation” from the early to mid 1980s onwards. 
  
2.1. Rise and fall of the Bretton Woods regime 
 
The first part of the post-world war II period was marked by the Bretton Woods International 
Monetary Regime. The beginning of this stage is characterized by the transition to a regime of 
convertibility, for current account transactions, by most Western European Countries, in 
December 1958. It involved the fixing of a par value for each currency in terms of gold. The 
framers of the system intended to reconcile the positive aspects of the classical gold standard 
(for example exchange rate stability, intense international trade) with autonomous national 
macroeconomic policies. The idea was that currency convertibility would be expected only 
for current account transactions (capital controls were accepted) and that exchange rates 
would be fixed but adjustable (in the face of fundamental disequilibria). According to Garber 
(1993): "The collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was one of the 
most accurately and generally predicted of major economic events." The intuition is that there 
are intrinsic elements of internal tension in any gold exchange standard.  Bordo (1993) 
categorizes the problems under the heading adjustment, liquidity and confidence. One aspect 
is known as the Triffin (1960) dilemma. The system relied on the convertibility of the US 
dollar into gold. On the other hand it required the availability of US dollars as liquidity. The 
latter required US balance of payment deficits, thereby undermining (the former) 
convertibility of the US dollar. The most symbolic moment was, perhaps, the suspension of 
the convertibility of the dollar into gold, in August 1971. The system then collapsed 
completely into a system of generalized floating in 1973. With the collapse of the last 
operational link to gold, the age of a commodity standard was over.   5
 
According to a very well-known folk theorem of international monetary economics, fixed 
exchange rates, freedom of movement of financial capital and autonomous monetary policy 
constitute an impossible trinity. As mentioned above, the Bretton Woods regime allowed for 
capital controls. Nevertheless, over time, in the context of full convertibility for current 
account transactions, the effectiveness of capital controls was gradually diminishing. The 
Bundesbank was vividly aware of the constraint that participation in the Bretton Woods 
systems imposed on its ability to pursue domestic price stability. During the period 1959-1973 
the DM was re-valued three times against the US dollar (1961, 1969 and 1971)
2. 
 
2.2. The stylized facts 
 
In the period 1960-1998, German inflation, measured in accordance with the Consumer Price 
Index, was, on average, 3.1 per cent per year (with a standard deviation of 1.8 percentage 
points). During this period German inflation was the lowest and most stable, as recorded 
internationally (see Table 2.1, which reports the average numbers of key macroeconomic 
variables for the G7 countries and Switzerland over that period). Only Switzerland came close 
with an average inflation rate of 3.3 per cent (and a standard deviation of 2.3 percentage 
points). These results compare with the US that recorded an inflation rate of 4.4 per cent, on 
average per year, with a standard deviation of 2.9 percentage points. Across the G7 countries 
inflation was highest and most volatile in Italy with, respectively, 7.4 per cent and 5.4 
percentage points for annual inflation and for its standard deviation. After the full period the 
Deutsche Mark (DM) had retained about 30 per cent of its original value, compared with less 
than 20 per cent for the US dollar, the Canadian dollar and the Japanese Yen, about 13 per 
cent for the French Franc, about 8.5 per cent for the Pound Sterling and only about 6 per cent 
for the Italian Lira.  
It is interesting (and instructive) to recall that during the 1960s, in the context of the Bretton 
Woods system, inflation was actually slightly higher in Germany than in the US. Specifically, 
the ten-year average was 2.4 per cent in Germany, while it was 2.3 per cent in the US (Canada 
was very close with an inflation rate of 2.5 per cent). Nevertheless, in the UK, France, Italy 
inflation was on average above 3 per cent and in Japan above 5 per cent. However, using an 
average for the sixties can be misleading. In the last years of the sixties, the rise in consumer 
                                                 
2 There were also short episodes of floating.    6
prices was accelerating in the US with inflation at 2.8 per cent in 1967, 4.2 per cent in 1968, 
5.4 per cent in 1969 and 5.9 per cent in 1970. The corresponding numbers for Germany were 
1.6, 1.6, 1.9 and 3.4 per cent. 
 
The differences between the inflation rates in Germany and the other G7 countries were most 
marked at the start of the period of floating exchange rates. In fact, in the period 1974-1982 
prices increased by 46 per cent in Germany (with an average annual rate of 4.8 per cent). In 
the same period of eight years, prices almost doubled in the US (with an annual average 
inflation rate of 9 per cent). The differences persisted in the subsequent disinflation. In the 
longer period 1974-1989 (the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall), prices increased by 72 per 
cent in Germany (with an average annual rate of 3.5 per cent) and by 181 per cent in the US 
(corresponding to an annual average rate of 6.7 per cent). It is also worth noting that only in 
Germany and Switzerland did inflation peak at single-digit levels in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Italy and the UK recorded two-digit ten-year averages in the 1970s. Italy did so in the 1980s 
as well (see Fig. 2.1). Table 2.1 shows that the same comparison also applies to the volatility 
of inflation
3. 
  
Germany’s favorable performance applies also to the behavior of nominal interest rates. In 
Figure 2.2 we show the averages of short-term (3 months) and long-term (10 years) interest 
rates during the 1970s. Evidently, German interest rates were then at the lower end of the 
interest-rate spectrum.  
 
Regarding the behavior of real variables, however, it is worth noting that they did not diverge 
significantly among industrialized countries during the same period. Figure 2.3 shows that in 
the 1970s, there was no obvious trade-off between real GDP growth rates and inflation across 
countries. 
 
2.3. Explanations of the Great Inflation 
 
To avoid the accusation of omitting important facts, let us refer briefly to the most widespread 
explanation of the Great Inflation. According to Bruno and Sachs (1985), the key factor 
                                                 
3 With some qualification for the case of Canada.   7
behind the acceleration of prices were the oil price shocks
4. Bruno and Sachs (1985) state 
(page 7): "A clear and central villain of the piece is the historically unprecedented rise in 
commodity prices (mainly food and oil) in 1973-74 and again in 1979-80 that not 
coincidentally accompanied the two great bursts of stagflation."  The traditional explanation 
emphasizes supply shocks and the subsequent demand response. Supply shocks play the role 
of the initial exogenous impulse followed by endogenous adjustment of the private sector and 
policy authorities. Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004) offer an alternative reading of the facts. 
According to their account, oil prices, and other commodity prices, should be seen as 
responding to global supply and demand factors. Specifically, the authors account for the 
increase in oil prices in 1973 as a delayed adjustment to consistent demand pressure persisting 
since the late 1960s. The adjustment was delayed because during the 1960s oil prices were 
regulated through long term contracts between oil producers and oil companies. In a situation 
of clear excess demand at the going price, conditions were ripe for OPEC to renege on its 
contractual agreements with oil companies leading to much higher oil prices. From such a 
viewpoint, it seems plausible that broad upward trends in commodity prices, the collapse of 
Bretton Woods and the collapse of the oil market regime were all driven by excess demand 
growth in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. This would be compatible, following Barsky 
and Kilian, with a broad monetary account of the Great Inflation. Despite our obvious 
sympathy for such an account, investigating it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Still, the fact that inflation in the US and other member countries of the Bretton Woods 
System accelerated well before the first hike in oil prices supports the hypothesis that demand 
shocks (among them, increases in government spending) in conjunction with accommodative 
monetary policy prepared the ground for the inflationary surges of the 1970s. Furthermore, 
Figure 2.1 suggests that it was the response to the oil price shocks of the 1970s that made 
most of the difference. The Bundesbank did not manage to avoid price acceleration 
completely (CPI inflation averaged 4.8 per cent during the 1970s) but performed much better 
than most of all other industrialized countries.
5 The remainder of the paper is thus devoted to 
the question: how did Germany manage to opt out of the Great Inflation? 
                                                 
4 Other related references would be Samuelson (1974), Gordon (1975), Blinder (1979), Darby (1982) and 
Hamilton (1983). 
5 The differences would be even more striking if one would consider a wider sample of industrialized countries 
(see, for example, Frenkel and Goldstein, 1999, who consider 23 countries).    8
3.  Sound money and price stability in Germany 
 
 
3.1. The legacy of the Bundesbank and stability-oriented monetary policy 
 
On 31 December 1998, together with all national central banks joining European Monetary 
Union, the Deutsche Bundesbank ended its life as a central bank being responsible for 
conducting monetary policy for its currency. Combining this period with the term of its 
predecessor, the Bank deutscher Länder, the overall period coincides with the existence of the 
D-Mark.
6 
The D-Mark developed − together with the Swiss Franc − into the most stable currency in the 
world after 1945, and the Bundesbank achieved a reputation as a model of a solid, successful 
central bank. This left a legacy reaching beyond its existence as a central bank responsible for 
a national currency. The statute of the European Central Bank, enshrined in the Maastricht 
Treaty, reflects this fact very well. But it is also fair to say that, in addition, the Bundesbank's 
track record influenced the world of central banking on a global scale. 
This world-wide attention was heavily influenced by the fact that Germany (again together 
with Switzerland) avoided the “Great Inflation” of the 1970s. What explains such a superior 
ability to approach price stability? In this sub-section, we will examine the historical, cultural 
and institutional background. In the next sub-section, we will develop a theoretical model 
which formalizes the Bundesbank’s strategy and in section 5, we will characterize 
quantitatively the conduct of monetary policy by the Bundesbank. 
To explain Germany’s post Second World War monetary history one has to go back to 1948 
and even beyond. The institutional foundation was laid in 1948 by law of the allies – (West) 
Germany did not yet exist as a state - which gave the Bank deutscher Länder independence 
from any political authorities.
7 When a few months later the D-Mark was introduced, this 
institution was entrusted preserving the stability of the new currency. 
                                                 
6 To be precise: The Bank deutscher Länder was established on 1 March 1948. The D-Mark became the currency 
of (then) West Germany on 21 June 1948. The Bundesbank replaced its predecessor on 26 July 1957. 
7  De jure the Allied Bank Commission could interfere, but never made any use of this prerogative. See 
Buchheim (1999).   9
The currency reform in cooperation with the simultaneous economic reforms of Ludwig 
Ehrhard laid the foundations of (West) Germany’s economic success, the so-called 
“Wirtschaftswunder” (economic miracle). 
As a consequence, most Germans for the first time in their life enjoyed a stable currency. This 
experience had a deep impact on the mind of the German people. The Mark, initially (1873) 
created as a currency based on gold had ended its existence in the hyperinflation of 1923 
which destroyed Germany’s civil society.
8 The successor of the Mark, the Reichsmark, 
created in 1924 ended its short life with the currency reform of 1948. People had again lost 
most of their wealth invested in nominal assets. No wonder that a strong aversion against 
inflation and a desire for monetary stability became deeply entrenched in the mind of the 
German people!
9 It became so entrenched in Germans' expectations, habits and customs that it 
deserved the special expression "stability culture". It is interesting to stress the virtuous 
interaction between Germany's stability culture and the independence of the Bundesbank. 
A particular historical episode illustrates it emphatically. The German Constitution of 1949 
required the Government to prepare the Deutsche Bundesbank law. It was no secret that then 
chancellor Konrad Adenauer was not a friend of an independent central bank. However, his 
clash with the central bank in May 1956 when he criticised in public the increase of the 
discount rate (from 4.5 to 5.5 percent) – “…the guillotine will hit ordinary citizens…” had 
already demonstrated to what extend the media and the public, at large, were behind the 
independence from political interference of the central bank. As a consequence, he lost the 
battle against the minister of the economy Ludwig Erhard. In the end, the Bundesbank law of 
1957 in section 12 stated explicitly that: “In exercising the powers conferred on it by this Act, 
[the Bundesbank] is independent of instructions from the Federal Government.” Together 
with the mandate in section 3 of “safeguarding the currency” the Bundesbank Act established 
the institutional fundament for a stability oriented monetary policy. 
10 
                                                 
8 Stefan Zweig (1970), a writer, claims in his memoirs of that time that the experience of this total loss of the 
value of the currency more than anything else made Germans "ripe for Hitler". 
9 It was interesting to see that in the days before the Berlin Wall fell demonstrators in the streets of Leipzig 
carried posters saying: “If the D-Mark is not coming to us we will come to the D-Mark”. So this desire for 
stability had also affected the mind of East Germans. 
 
10 It is interesting to note that "safeguarding the currency" initially referred to the "domestic" as well as the 
"external" value (i.e. the exchange rate) of the currency. Over time the Bundesbank succeeded in obtaining 
general acceptance of its interpretation of safeguarding the purchasing power of the currency.   10
Notwithstanding the fact that this law could have been changed at any time by a simple 
majority of the legislative and insofar seemed to be based on shaky legal ground, the 
reputation of the Bundesbank became such that there was never any serious initiative to 
change the law. The status of the Bundesbank and the support for its stability oriented 
monetary policy was firmly grounded on (and, in turn, reinforced) the “stability culture” (see 
Issing 1993). 
At the time of the ratification of the Bundesbank Act there were not only hardly any 
independent central banks in the world, it is even difficult to find any serious discussion in the 
literature on the issue of an appropriate institutional arrangement for a central bank. Interest in 
this topic was mainly triggered by the experience of the “Great Inflation” in the 1970s and the 
more and more obvious failures of monetary policy in many countries. First publications 
discussed credibility issues (Barro and Gordon) and the time inconsistency problem (Kydland 
and Prescott). The outcome of monetary policy depending on the statute − here the degree of 
independence of the central bank − caused broader attention not before 1990s with a paper by 
Alesina and Summers.
11 
Since, the number of publications on central bank independence has exploded, discussing all 
aspects from defining independence, measuring its degree to designing optimal contracts for 
central bankers. Is it wrong to say that the good performance of the Bundesbank not least in 
the 1970s has contributed to, if not triggered, this branch of research? 
This interest in the topic and the result by more and more research papers has also supported 
the claim to give independence to the new central bank which still had to be founded, the 
European Central Bank. One should not forget that some of the countries signing the 
Maastricht Treaty at that time (1992) still had not given independence to their own national 
central banks. Since then “independence” of the central bank has become a model also on a 
global scale. 
In a nutshell the message stemming from experience and theory is: Institutions matter! The 
outcome of monetary policy is heavily dependent on the institutional design of the central 
bank. 
                                                 
11 See Alesina and Summers (1990). An early paper by Bade and Parkin (1980) was widely ignored and not even 
published.   11
Another aspect of great importance pertained the exchange rate regime (see previous section 
for a brief reference to the Bretton Woods system and some selected references to the relevant 
literature). For many years, the Bundesbank was in favour of a fixed exchange rate of the D-
Mark against the US-Dollar. It even argued against the appreciation of the D-Mark in 1961. 
The law of the “uneasy triangle” had been more or less forgotten (Issing 2006). However, 
towards the end of the 1960s, it became increasingly apparent that the fixed exchange rate 
was a constraint for conducting a monetary policy geared towards a domestic goal, namely 
price stability. (Richter 1999; von Hagen 1999). In a regime of a fixed exchange rate and free 
capital flows, money growth becomes endogenous and any attempt to withstand the import of 
inflation is finally self-defeating. 
The Bundesbank experienced a period of excessive money growth driven by interventions 
buying US-Dollars. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the external component of money 
creation was sometimes even higher than the growth of the monetary base, implying that the 
internal contribution of money creation was negative. The consequences of this constellation 
for the institutional design of monetary policy were far-reaching: The Bundesbank, 
notwithstanding its independence from political interference, equipped with all the necessary 
instruments, was powerless with respect to pursuing a domestic goal since the exchange rate 
was fixed and capital flowed freely across borders. This fundamentally changed when in 
March 1973 Germany let its currency float against the US-Dollar. The Bundesbank being 
relieved from its obligation to intervene in the exchange market could now consider 
conducting a monetary policy to safeguard the internal stability of its money, i.e. maintaining 
price stability. 
The Bundesbank declared the fight against inflation to be the principal goal of its monetary 
policy
12 and, in line with this, had already started to slow down inflation (which had peaked at 
almost 8 per cent in mid-1973) when in October 1973, the first oil crisis broke out. The rise in 
oil prices thwarted the efforts of the Bundesbank while real output started to decline at the 
same time. Being confronted with such a situation, the Bundesbank attempted to keep 
monetary expansion within strict limits in order to avoid possible spill-over effects into the 
wage and price-setting. In doing so, it did, however, not commit itself to any clear strategy 
and quantification.
13 Instead, the Bundesbank mainly tried to influence the behaviour of 
                                                 
12 See Deutsche Bundesbank (1974), Annual Report, p. 45. 
13 In fact, the Bundesbank tried to ensure that “monetary expansion was not too great but not to small either”. 
See Deutsche Bundesbank (1974), Annual Report, especially p. 17.   12
market participants by means of “moral suasion”. However, the social partners more or less 
ignored the signals given by the Bundesbank and agreed on high increases in nominal wages 
in 1974 trying to compensate for the loss in real disposable income. As a consequence 
unemployment increased and inflation went up.  
Against this experience, the idea of adopting a formal quantitative target for money growth 
which would provide a nominal anchor for inflation and inflation expectations rapidly gained 
ground. As it happened this period coincided with the “monetarist counterrevolution.” The 
leading monetarists Milton Friedman, Karl Brunner and Alan Meltzer claimed that central 
banks should abstain from any attempt to fine-tune the economy and should instead follow a 
strategy of monetary targeting. (A floating exchange rate was a necessary condition for 
controlling the money supply.) These ideas in principle found positive reactions in Germany 
(Richter 1999; von Hagen 1999). The Bundesbank discussed this approach internally and with 
leading proponents. Helmut Schlesinger, member of the Executive Board and chief 
economist, had an intensive exchange of views not least when participating in the 
intellectually influential Konstanz Seminar founded by Karl Brunner in 1970.
14 The rejection 
of fine-tuning and the medium-term orientation of monetary policy implied by monetary 
targeting was strongly supported also by the German Sachverständigenrat (1974). 
However, in spite of the Bundesbank being the first central bank in the world to adopt a 
monetary target (for the year 1975), the honeymoon with leading monetarists came soon to an 
end. This process started already when the Bundesbank declared its move to the new strategy 
“an experiment”, stressed that it would not (and, in the short run, could not) control the 
monetary base, and over many years missed its monetary target. 
The Bundesbank interpreted its approach as a kind of “pragmatic monetarism” and kept to 
this strategy until 1998 (see Baltensperger 1999, Issing 2005, and also Neumann, 1997, 1999). 
Not surprisingly, this attitude was heavily criticised especially by Karl Brunner (1983). 
However, in its monetary policy practice, the strategy served the Bundesbank well in 
defending the stability of its currency - if not in absolute terms it did at least (together with the 
Swiss National Bank) substantially better than most other central banks.  
 
                                                 
14 See Fratianni and von Hagen (2001). The authors give a comprehensive survey on subjects discussed and 
persons attending. The seminar still continues and was chaired for many years by the leading German 
monetarist Manfred Neumann.   13
3.2. The conduct of policy under monetary targeting
15 
a) Derivation of the money growth target  
The choice of a monetary target in 1974 undoubtedly signalled a fundamental regime shift. 
Not only was it a clear break with the past but also a decision to discard alternative 
approaches to monetary policy.
16 There were two main arguments in favour of providing a 
quantified guidepost for the future rate of monetary expansion. First and foremost was the 
intention of controlling inflation through the control of monetary expansion. Second, the 
Bundesbank tried to provide guidance to agents' (especially wage bargainers') expectations 
through the announcement of a quantified objective for monetary growth.
17 Therefore, with its 
new strategy, the Bundesbank clearly signalled its responsibility for the control of inflation. 
At the same time, the Bundesbank expressed its view, that while monetary policy by 
maintaining price stability in the longer run would exert a positive impact on economic 
growth, the fostering of the economy’s growth potential should be considered a task of fiscal 
and structural policies, while employment was a responsibility of the social partners 
conducting wage negotiations.  
Although the formulation of the new strategy was heavily influenced by the ideas of the 
leading monetarists, the implementation of monetary targeting in Germany deviated from the 
theoretical blueprint in a number of ways. One important difference was that Bundesbank did 
not formulate its targets in terms of the monetary base, but in terms of a broadly defined 
monetary aggregate, the central bank money stock (defined as currency in circulation plus the 
required minimum reserves on domestic deposits calculated at constant reserve ratios with 
base January 1974).
18 Secondly, the Bundesbank did not attempt to control the money stock 
directly, but followed an indirect approach of influencing money demand by varying key 
money market rates and bank reserves (two-stage implementation procedure). Thirdly, the 
Bundesbank made it clear from the beginning that it could not and would not promise to 
                                                 
15 Parts of the following section are taken from Issing (2005). 
16 It must be recognized that the start of monetary targeting was characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. 
After all, Germany had just come out of the Bretton Woods “adjustable peg” system in which many topics 
were seen as irrelevant.  
17 See Schlesinger (1983) on this issue. 
 
18 The ratios were 16.6% for sight deposits, 12.4% for time deposits and 8.1% for savings deposits. After the 
mid-eighties, the heavy weight on currency increasingly proved to be a disadvantage, and when setting the 
target for 1988, the Bundesbank switched to the money stock M3. See Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), p. 81f.   14
reach the monetary target with any degree of precision. Accordingly, in this period, the new 
regime of monetary targeting was in many respects an experiment. 
From the outset, the Bundesbank recognized the importance of adopting a simple, transparent 
and at the same time comprehensible method for the derivation of the annual monetary 
targets.
19 The analytical background for the derivation formula was provided by the quantity 
theory of money. Starting from the quantity identity, one gets that average money growth, 
m Δ , and average inflation,  p Δ , will fulfil the identity: 
(3.1)      t t t t y p v m Δ + Δ ≡ Δ + Δ      
where p, m, y and v are the (logs of the) price level, the money stock, real income and the 
income velocity of money, respectively, and the bars denote long-run average values. Taking 
the velocity trend and the long-run average rate of real output growth to be exogenous, it 
follows from (3.1) that trend inflation can be pinned down by controlling the trend rate of 
money growth:  
(3.2)      t t t t v y m p Δ + Δ − Δ = Δ     
Based on this reasoning, the Bundesbank derived the target for average money growth in year 
t, 
*
t m Δ , from the sum of the (maximum) rise in prices it was willing to tolerate, 
*
t p Δ , the 
predicted growth in potential output, 
*
1 t t y E Δ − , and the expected trend rate of change in 
velocity, 
*
1 t t v E Δ − : 
(3.3)        ) ( ) (
*
1
*
1
* *
t t t t t t v E y E p m Δ − Δ + Δ = Δ − −  
where the deltas now represent year-on-year changes, and Et-1 denotes expectations at the end 
of year t-1. The target rate for average (year-on-year) money growth was then translated into a 
target rate for money growth in the course of the year (see Table 3.2 and Neumann, 1997, 
180ff). 
The approach reflected the insight that monetary growth consistent with this derivation would 
create the appropriate conditions for real growth in line with price stability. While these basic 
relationships were uncontested over medium to longer-term horizons, the Bundesbank was 
                                                 
19 See also Issing (1997) for the following considerations. 
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fully aware of the fact that they might not strictly apply over the shorter term. On a month-to-
month or quarter-to-quarter basis and even beyond, the basic relationship between the money 
stock and the overall domestic price level was often obscured by a variety of other factors. 
Any attempt to strictly tie money growth to its desired path in the short-term might have led 
to disturbing volatility in interest and exchange rates, thus imposing unnecessary adjustment 
costs on the economy. Accordingly, the Bundesbank repeatedly pointed to the medium-term 
nature of its strategy and explained that it was prepared to tolerate short-term deviations from 
the target path if that seemed advisable or acceptable in terms of the overriding goal of price 
stability.   
b) From 1975 to 1978 – the learning phase 
First experiences with monetary targets were not particularly encouraging. Between 1975 and 
1978, the quantitative targets were clearly (and in 1978 considerably) overshot (see Table 
3.2). The sharp increase in interest rates which had taken placed immediately after the end of 
the Bretton Woods System was almost completely reversed in 1974/75 and real short-term 
interest rates were kept rather low until the beginning of 1979 (see Figure 4.2a). Clarida and 
Gertler (1997) interpret this as evidence “that the Bundesbank’s commitment to fight inflation 
waned somewhat during the period between the two major oil shocks”. Von Hagen (1999) 
argues that following the first oil price shock, short-term employment-related goals gained 
prominence. In the Bundesbank’s own reading, the loosening was mainly motivated by two 
considerations which, in hindsight, turned out to be partly based on misjudgments. First, 
policymakers apparently overestimated the extent to which the currency appreciation would 
dampen real activity and inflation. The second misjudgment concerned the depth of the 1975 
recession, which in hindsight, turned out to have been greatly overestimated (see Gerberding 
et al., 2004).
20 
Nevertheless, the Bundesbank was able to slow down inflation from the high levels before to 
2.7% in 1978. During this period the Bundesbank gained valuable insights into the new 
regime and introduced a number of technical modifications (see Table 3.2). These experiences 
helped the Bundesbank to enhance the monetary targeting concept from its experimental stage 
into a fully-fledged strategy. As a consequence, at the end of 1978, the potential-oriented 
monetary targeting strategy had been established and had proven its value. Therefore, the 
                                                 
20 See Bundesbank, AR 1975 and 1976.   16
Bundesbank was well prepared when the German economy entered especially troubled 
waters. 
c) From 1979 to 1985 – the strategy bears fruit  
The economic situation in 1978 was broadly seen as rather comfortable. German real GDP 
had grown by around 3 per cent, accompanied by high levels of employment growth and 
falling unemployment. The situation was, however, less positive in terms of monetary growth 
and inflation. Monetary growth had overshot its target and there were signs of acceleration in 
the rate of inflation, which in 1978 stood, on average, at 2.7%. Furthermore, in 1979, the 
sharp increase in oil prices associated with the second oil price shock hit the German 
economy. The resulting massive increase in import prices, especially energy prices, 
augmented by a weakening of the exchange rate, brought about a turnaround in Germany’s 
current account position, leading to a current account deficit in 1979 for the first time in many 
years.  
At the same time, government fiscal policy was clearly expansionary. Thus, fiscal policy 
rendered the central bank’s task even more difficult. Moreover, the European Monetary 
System (EMS), an exchange rate regime defining the exchange rates of participating 
currencies in terms of central rates against the ECU, had begun rather quietly in March 1979, 
but subsequently faced tensions and the need to adjust parities from as early as September 
1979. 
It was obvious from the beginning that the direct effect of the oil price shock on consumer 
prices could not be prevented by monetary policy. At the same time, the Bundesbank had 
carefully analysed the lessons of the first oil price shock. Against this experience, in 1979 the 
Governing Council of the Bundesbank was well aware of the threat that the oil price increase 
could translate again into sustained increases in inflation brought about by second-round 
effects in wage and price-setting.
21 In responding to these challenges, the Bundesbank took 
decisive action. The discount rate was increased in steps from 3 per cent at the start of 1979 to 
reach 7.5 per cent in May 1980. In parallel, the Lombard rate was increased from its initial 
level of 3.5 per cent to 9.5 per cent in May 1980, and in February 1981 - as a special Lombard 
                                                 
21 See Schlesinger (1980) on this point. 
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– to as much as 12 per cent, the normal Lombard window being closed.
22 By subsequently 
reducing the monetary targets from 1979 onwards, the Bundesbank sent out a clear signal for 
restoring price stability. 
Not until the second half of 1981 did the growth rates for the monetary base begin to come 
down. Towards the end of 1981, there were increasingly clear signs of an easing of price and 
wage pressures. The D-Mark regained confidence in the foreign exchange markets and 
strengthened again, not only within the EMS but also in relation to the US-Dollar. The 
external adjustment process was promoted through a slowdown in domestic demand and the 
current account position improved noticeably. Furthermore, through the “monetary warning”, 
the government became aware of the unsustainability of its deficit policy. From then on, 
budget consolidation was increasingly recognized as being an urgent task. 
The subsequent years 1982-85 can be regarded as a phase of monetary relaxation and 
normalisation. The Bundesbank’s monetary policy was focused on bringing down inflation 
and restoring the stability of the currency, and it proved able to realise this aim throughout the 
period. The benchmark figure for the tolerated rate of inflation (which, until 1984, was termed 
the “unavoidable” rate of price increase) was gradually reduced from 3 ½ % in 1982 to 2% in 
1985. At the same time, actual inflation fell steadily from an annual average rate of 5.2% in 
1982 to 2.0 % in 1985. When price stability was virtually reached in the middle of the 1980s, 
the Bundesbank changed over from the concept of an “unavoidable” rate of inflation to a 
medium-term price norm or price assumption of no more than 2% (see Table 3.1).  
d) The last test – German reunification 
Given the stability-oriented monetary policy strategy and the developments described above it 
is far from surprising that, at the end of the eighties, the Bundesbank was one of the most 
respected central banks in the world. At the beginning of the 1990s, it was about to face an 
important historical test, in the form of German re-unification.  
The D-mark was introduced in the eastern Länder on 1 June 1990. Curiously the introduction 
of the currency preceded political unification (3 October 1990). The extension of the 
territorial scope of monetary policy clearly led to a significant increase in uncertainty. 
Specifically, the operation entailed an increase in money supply of the order of 15% of West 
                                                 
22 See Baltensperger (1999) for a more detailed description of this period, the monetary targets and their 
realisations.   18
German money stock. This number compared with about 10%, which would have been 
appropriate on the basis of estimates of the relative size of the former GDR's GDP at market 
prices. Moreover, there were additional factors challenging the conduct of the Bundesbank's 
stability-oriented policy. In fact, German re-unification led to a massive expansion of 
aggregate expenditure in Germany, including sizeable general government deficits. As a 
consequence inflation rose quickly, with price increases (in West Germany) exceeding 4% in 
the second half of 1991. 
How could the Bundesbank under these circumstances maintain price stability over the 
medium term? How could it preserve credibility? 
The Bundesbank decided to stick to its tried and tested framework, including the normative 
rate of 2% for inflation. This option implied that the Bundesbank was, for a short time, 
prepared to accept monetary expansion above the announced target. Again, the money growth 
targets proved to be highly beneficial in terms of anchoring inflation expectations, even 
though it was not easy to derive an adequate money growth target for reunited Germany (see 
Issing et al., 2005, p. 3f).  The Bundesbank abided by its well-proven strategy right up to the 
beginning of EMU in January 1999. While some technical features of the strategy (e.g. the 
exact definition of the target variable) were changed over time, its major elements – the 
explicit derivation of the annual money growth targets from medium-term macro-economic 
benchmark figures, the flexible implementation which included temporary departures from 
the medium-term rule, and the two-stage implementation procedure- - stayed intact. In this 
respect, the Bundesbank’s approach certainly stands out by reason of its consistency and 
remarkable continuity. 
e) Lessons 
What are the lessons that can be drawn? Why was Germany better able to counter the 
inflationary shocks of the 1970s than most other countries? Several key aspects emerge from 
this brief review of German monetary policy after the end of the Bretton Woods System. To 
begin with, the Bundesbank was the first central bank to announce a monetary target and thus 
to undertake a strategy of commitment, transparently communicated to the public.
23 
Moreover, when announcing the money growth targets, the Bundesbank disclosed the most 
important guiding principles behind its decisions, such as the maximum rise in prices that 
                                                 
23 See Issing, 1992, p. 291.   19
would be tolerated by the central bank and its estimate of potential output growth. By doing 
so, the Bundesbank fostered transparency and provided an anchor for medium-term inflation 
expectations. In retrospect, against the background of the more recent debate about the merits 
of an intensive communication policy, these elements of the Bundesbank’s strategy appear 
very modern indeed.  
After the initial years of experimentation, the strategy had proven its value in the baptism of 
fire of 1979 and the early 1980s. In doing so, it had managed to establish credibility which, in 
turn, had started to set in motion a virtuous circle. Still, one may well ask – and indeed, it has 
often been asked – how the Bundesbank was able to get away with its practice of deviating 
time and again from the announced targets while at the same time preserving its reputation as 
a bulwark of monetary stability.
24 After all, even if one excludes the years 1975-78, the 
targets were missed seven out of 20 times (see Figure 3.1).  
As explained by Issing (1997, p. 71f), the target misses were rarely of a completely 
involuntary nature, but mostly constituted deliberate monetary policy decisions. Yet, it was 
exactly in those situations that the monetary targets had an especially valuable disciplining 
effect because once a target was missed the decision makers were put under pressure to justify 
the outcome in terms of the ultimate aim of safeguarding the currency. Similarly, Schlesinger 
(2002) argues that the targets imposed discipline on the decision makers by forcing them to 
explain their decisions and to persuade the public that failures to meet the intermediate target 
did not jeopardise the final goal of policy. Finally, according to Neumann (2006, p. 14), “the 
Bundesbank was the first central bank that provided the public (or at least, an elite audience), 
with an intelligible numerical framework that facilitated the evaluation of its policy course 
from the outside”. Viewed from this perspective, the money growth targets represented a 
movement away from purely discretionary policy towards a more rule-based behaviour. The 
Bundesbank itself has sometimes designated its strategy as constrained or disciplined 
discretion, Neumann (1997) talks of “rule-based discretion”.  
                                                 
24 See Neumann, 2006, p. 14.   20
4. Monetary targeting as a commitment device 
As explained in the previous section, the Bundesbank did not attempt to control the money 
stock directly, but followed an indirect management procedure which worked via influencing 
conditions in the money market. Hence, on a basic level, the Bundesbank’s approach may be 
described as setting the short-tem interest rate so as to achieve the rate of money growth that 
was viewed as consistent with the attainment of the final goal, price stability. In this section, 
we present a model which formalises this approach and enables us to compare the implied 
interest rate rule with other interest rate rules proposed in the academic literature (such as the 
Taylor rule and its many variants).   
Taylor (1999) and more recently, Orphanides (2003) and Kilponen and Leitemo (2008) have 
discussed the implications of targeting money growth for a central bank which sets the short-
term interest rate. Although we know from the previous section that the Bundesbank’s 
practice of monetary targeting differed from the monetarist blueprint in a number of ways, it 
is still instructive to consider the simple case of a “pure” or “strict” money growth rule first. 
Under strict money growth targeting, the central bank is required to find the short-term 
interest rate, it, which sets the growth rate of money equal to the pre-specified target:  
(4.1)      
*
t t m m Δ = Δ   
subject to a money demand relation that relates real money holdings to output and the interest 
rate:
25  
(4.2)     ( )
md
tt y ti t t mp y i η ηε −= ⋅ − ⋅ +     
where 
md
t ε  captures short-run dynamics and shocks to money demand. Taking first 
differences, the growth rate of money is related to the inflation rate, the change in the nominal 
interest rate and the growth rate of output through 
(4.2a)      Δmt = πt +  ηy Δyt -  ηi Δit + Δ
md
t ε .       
Given the money demand relation (4.2), equilibrium velocity can be written as  
                                                 
25 Such a money demand equation can be derived from the optimization problem of a household who values 
money holdings in its utility function that is separable in real balances and consumption goods, see Woodford 
(2003).   21
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and equilibrium changes in velocity  
(4.3a)    
** * * (1 )
v
ty t i t t vy i η ηε Δ=− Δ−⋅ Δ− Δ  
are represented by a function of potential output growth and of changes in the steady-steady 
level of the nominal interest rate (if there are any). We define the velocity shock 
* v
t ε  as a 
shock to equilibrium money demand. We interpret 
* v
t ε  as a portfolio shock that can be 
observed by the central bank due to its institutional knowledge. 
As discussed in the previous section, a central bank with the objective of controlling long-run 
average inflation will set the money growth target equal to the “acceptable” rate of inflation, 
πt*, adjusted for the predicted growth rate of potential output and the expected trend rate of 
change in velocity (which is exactly what the Bundesbank did):  
(4.4)       Δm t
*
 = πt
* + EtΔyt
* - EtΔv t
* 
Note that in contrast to Eq (3.3), we now assume that the money growth targets are based on 
current-period expectations of 
*
t y Δ  and 
*
t v Δ , which presupposes that the money growth 
targets are regularly updated to take account of revisions in the estimates of potential output 
growth and the trend change in velocity.
26 From (4.3a) the formula for the money growth 
target can be reformulated as:  
(4.4a)    
** * * .
v
tty t t t mE y π ηε Δ=+ Δ + Δ  
where we abstract from changes in the nominal equilibrium interest rate (as the Bundesbank 
did).
27   
                                                 
26 As regards the Bundesbank, the fact that the targets were usually formulated as a corridor of 2 or 3 percentage 
points (see Table 3.2) provided flexibility for adjustments to changes in the underlying estimates. In addition, 
there was a regular mid-year review of the targets. 
27 See Gerberding et al. (2007), p. 5f.   22
Combining (4.2a) and (4.4a), the deviation of money growth from target can now be 
expressed as:   
(4.5)  { }
** * * () .
md v
tt t t y t t t i t t t mm y E y i ππη η ε ε Δ− Δ=−+ Δ −Δ− Δ + Δ − Δ   
Using the equality of actual money growth with target (equation (4.1)) entails:  
(4.6)     { }
** * () 0
md v
tt ytt t i t t t yE y i ππη η ε ε −+Δ − Δ− Δ + Δ − Δ = 
Solving for the nominal interest rate, (4.6) can be transformed into an instrument rule of the 
form: 
(4.7)     { }
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1
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According to (4.7), money growth targeting implies an interest rate reaction to the lagged 
interest rate, to the deviation of inflation from target, to the deviation of actual output growth 
from (the central bank’s estimate of) potential output growth (which is equivalent to the 
change in the output gap), and to the difference between the “true” money demand shock 
md
t ε Δ , and the portfolio shock observed by the central bank, 
* v
t ε Δ . As pointed out by 
Orphanides (2003), the interest rate rule implied by (strict) money growth targeting thus 
belongs to the class of “natural-growth targeting rules”,  which do not rely on estimates of the 
natural rate of interest and output and thus “stay clear of the pitfalls known to plague the 
natural-rate-gap-based policy approach” (p. 990). Notice, however, that in order to be a 
meaningful specification, which would be suitable for characterizing the practical 
implementation of monetary policy, the money demand shocks in (4.7) should have 
reasonable properties. We will discuss this issue in more detail in Section 5 where we present 
our empirical results. 
However, as discussed in the previous section, the Bundesbank did not adhere to a strict 
version of the Friedman rule, but instead pursued a strategy of “pragmatic monetarism”. Most 
importantly, the assumption that the central bank hits the money growth target each period 
which underlies Equation (4.1) is at odds with the Bundesbank’s acclaimed medium-term 
orientation and the fact that it tolerated short-term deviations from target.    23
According to Issing, one of the fundamental functions of a monetary policy strategy is to 
confer credibility to the achievement of the final goal of price stability (see, for example, 
Issing et al. 2005). In order to incorporate the key issues of credibility, commitment and 
reputation in our analysis, we choose a framework which allows us to interpret a monetary 
target as a commitment device. Specifically, we assume that the Bundesbank council re-
optimized the setting of the policy instrument(s) every period, that is, it acted under 
discretion. However, in our reading, policymakers were aware of the problems associated 
with discretionary policy and used monetary targeting as a device to get closer to the optimal 
(but time-inconsistent) commitment solution. In particular, we assume that when setting 
interest rates, the objective of the Bundesbank council was to minimize deviations of inflation 
and money growth from target, while also seeking to stabilize output and the interest rate 
around their respective target values:
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where ß is the discount factor, xt is the output gap defined as the gap between actual output, yt, 
and potential output, yt
*, and  x λ ˆ ,  i λ ˆ and  m λ ˆ  are the relative weights attached to the output, 
interest rate and money growth terms. 
The use of a modified loss function to attenuate the pitfalls associated with discretionary 
monetary policy was pioneered by Rogoff (1985). More recently, several authors have 
analysed the properties of monetary policy strategies based on modified loss functions in the 
context of forward-looking new Keynesian-type models. There are many variants of modified 
loss functions including, price level targeting (Svensson, 1999, Vestin, 2006, Røisland, 2006 
and Gaspar et al., 2007), average inflation targeting (Nessén and Vestin, 2005), interest rate 
smoothing (Woodford, 1999), nominal income growth targeting (Jensen, 2002) and speed 
limit targeting (Walsh, 2003).  
For our purposes, the most closely related contribution in the literature is Söderström (2005) 
who analyses the implications of delegating a loss function to the central bank which deviates 
from society’s true loss function by an additional money growth target. As shown by 
                                                 
28 In the loss function (4.8), we have abstracted from the complications arising from a gap between the efficient 
and the natural level of output, but one should keep in mind that with a positive value of x*, the optimal 
discretionary policy suffers from an average inflation bias as well as a stabilisation bias; see Woodford, 2003, 
p. 469ff.   24
Söderström, this modification can be beneficial for a central bank acting under discretion 
since the money growth target introduces interest rate inertia and history dependence into 
interest rate decisions, both of which are features of the optimal commitment policy. In 
Söderström’s baseline simulations, a money growth target closes about 80% of the gap 
between discretionary policy and the optimal policy under pre-commitment. This result is the 
more remarkable given the fact that it is obtained in the context of  a standard New Keynesian 
model where money growth is neither useful as an indicator of future inflation nor of output 
growth, and where money plays no direct role in the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. 
Nevertheless, our objective differs from Söderström’s. Specifically, we want to derive the 
interest rate rule characterizing optimal discretionary policy under the modified loss function 
(4.8). In our reading, this loss function captures some relevant dimensions of the 
Bundesbank's approach of pragmatic monetarism. Most importantly, it accounts for misses of 
the monetary target in the context of a strategy where monetary growth is always important 
for monetary policy-making. Hence, we expect the interest rate rule implied by this loss 
function to provide a useful starting point for the empirical analysis undertaken in Section 5.  
In order to derive the interest rate rule implied by the modified loss function (4.8), we need a 
model of the underlying structural relationships between the target variables. To keep the 
analysis as simple as possible, we assume that these relationships are adequately captured by 
the standard New Keynesian model which, despite its well-known limitations, is the 
workhorse in the theory of monetary policy-making.  
Specifically, we use the baseline version of the model which consists of an aggregate supply 
and an aggregate demand equation, augmented by the simple money demand relation (4.2):
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29 For details on the model, see Woodford, 2007, p. 6f.   25
where 
π
t u  is a cost-push shock and 
π
t r  is a natural-rate shock. For simplicity’s sake, we 
assume that both are i.i.d. Combining Eq (4.2) with the definition of the money growth target  
from Eq (4.4a) yields:  
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where 
* v
t
md
t t ε ε ε − =  and we have again assumed that the money growth target is regularly 
updated to take account of observed portfolio shifts and of revisions in the central bank’s 
estimates of potential output growth. Alternatively, the shock variable in (4.11) would have to 
be modified to include shocks to potential output growth.
30 
Clearly, the model misses some important elements for understanding monetary policy 
making, such as the role of financial factors in the transmission mechanism. Nevertheless, it 
does provide a simple and workable framework to discuss the key issues of commitment, 
credibility and reputation (see, for example, Gaspar and Kashyap, 2007). 
We are now in a position to derive the interest rate rule implied by the modified period loss 
function (4.8) subject to the underlying model composed of Eq. (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11a). 
Formally, the solution can be found by minimising the Lagrangian expression: 
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30 Loss function (4.8) assumes that output is targeted at the natural rate, which is a time-varying variable. If 
output-gap targeting is feasible, the value of the natural rate must be known (or, in real-life terms, a good 
estimate is available). Therefore, yt
n can, in principle, also serve as an input for the (time-varying) money 
growth target. See Jensen, 2002, p. 948.       26
with respect to the paths of each of the four endogenous variables, πt, xt, Δmt and it. The 
derivation is complicated by the fact that the money growth target introduces lagged values of 
the endogenous variables into the state vector. In any stationary equilibrium therefore, the 
expected values of the endogenous variables will depend on their own lagged values.
31 In 
general, analytical solutions to this kind of problem are not available, but Söderlind (1999) 
and Dennis (2007) have developed algorithms which provide numerical solutions. While we 
do not want to take that route here, it is possible to gain important insights into the nature of 
the policy problem by considering the analytical solution to the much simpler static version of  
the problem.
32 Hence, in what follows we assume that when taking interest rate decisions, the 
Bundesbank Council was concerned only with minimizing the current period loss function, 
taking private sector expectations as given. In this case, (4.12) reduces to: 
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and the first-order conditions are:  
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Solving for the Lagrangian multipliers and inserting the solutions into (4.13c) yields: 
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31 See Clarida et al.(1999), p. 1692, FN 74, or Walsh (2003). 
32 For a similar approach, see Guender and Oh (2006).    27
which can be transformed into an (implicit) instrument rule of the form:  
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Eq (4.15) reproduces the well-known result that the implicit interest rule under discretion 
takes the form of a standard Taylor rule. However, the inclusion of a money growth term in 
the loss function implies an additional interest rate response to deviations of money growth 
from target. Interestingly, the Euler equations (“targeting rules”) derived by Dennis (2007) for 
the case of fully optimal discretionary policy take essentially the same form as Eq (4.15). This 
suggests that the functional form of the policy rule (4.15) is not specific to the simple one-
period optimization problem considered here, but carries over to the much more complex 
intertemporal optimization problem.
33 Note, however, that in order to apply the Dennis 
algorithm to the problem described by Eq (4.12), the model has to be extended to include the 
first difference of the interest rate in the vector of endogenous variables.
34 As a consequence, 
under fully optimal discretionary policy, the current interest rate will be a function of the first 
difference of the interest rate as well as of all the variables included in Eq (4.15).  
In order to test whether the Bundesbank attached any weight to its money growth targets 
(relative to other potential targets), we could stop the analysis here and estimate Eq (4.15) 
directly. This is the route taken by most empirical studies, such as Clarida et al.(1998). 
However, in order to make the policy rule implied by the modified loss function (4.8) more 
directly comparable with other types of simple interest rate rules, we do not follow this 
approach here, but instead repeat the above exercise and eliminate the money growth term 
from Equation (4.15). The process of elimination of money growth deviations from the policy 
rule mimics the steps we have taken above for the case of pure money growth targeting. To 
simplify the procedure, we first re-write Eq (4.15) as: 
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33 See Dennis (2007), Eq (25).  
34 The model is closed by including the definition of the additional variable,  1 − − = Δ t t t i i i , among the model 
equations. See Dennis (2007), Technical Appendix.   28
and then use Eq (4.11) to substitute out the money growth term:  
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According to (4.18), the interest rate rule of a central bank that targets money growth differs 
from a standard Taylor rule in that it implies a response to the deviation of actual output 
growth from potential output growth (which is equivalent to targeting the change in the output 
gap) as well as a response to the lagged interest rate and to the difference between the “true” 
money demand shock and the portfolio shock observed by the central bank. As shown by 
Giannoni and Woodford (2003), responding to the lagged interest rate (interest rate inertia) 
and to the change rather than the level of the output gap (history dependence) are both 
features of the optimal commitment policy. (4.18) therefore nicely illustrates the argument put 
forth by Söderström (2005) that money growth targeting may play a useful role in overcoming 
the stabilisation bias of discretionary policy. The response to money demand shocks implied 
by Eq (4.18) is usually viewed as a major drawback of monetary targeting. However, it cannot 
be established a priori how serious this problem is when the central bank takes into account 
portfolio shifts when implementing monetary targeting (as routinely practiced by the 
Bundesbank ). In section 5 we attempt to look at the relevant empirical evidence.  
Equation (4.18) is the basis for the interest rate rule that we will estimate in the next section.
35 
As before, the intuition presented is predicated on some restrictions on the behavior of the 
error term in the money demand equation. We will further discuss the issue in section 5 
below. 
                                                 
35 In the simple model above we do not consider lags in monetary transmission. In the empirical results we will 
see that forecast inflation performs better than current inflation. Transmission lags can rationalize such result 
(see comments in section 5).   29
5.  The Conduct of Monetary Policy and Monetary Policy Rules 
In this section, our goal is to provide a systematic comparison of policy rules followed in 
Germany, the US and the UK. To allow for a fair comparison, our aim was to use model 
specifications for each of the three countries that are as similar as possible regarding the 
dynamic structure and the corresponding variables. In order to provide a more precise 
characterization of systematic differences in the conduct of monetary policy, we estimate and 
compare interest rate reaction functions. The specification of the estimated reaction functions 
is based on the interest rate rule derived in the previous section, which includes the elements 
of a standard Taylor rule as well as the features implied by including a money growth target 
in the loss function.  
 
5.1. Brief reference to the literature 
 
There is a voluminous literature about monetary policy reaction functions, especially as 
regards the US. According to the established view, there was a regime shift around October 
1979 (the start of the Volcker disinflation)
36. The broad strand of the empirical literature sees 
the main difference between the pre-Volcker period and the Volcker-Greenspan period as 
pertaining to the interest response to an increase in inflation (or expected inflation). 
Specifically, the claim is that the coefficient, measuring the interest rate response to inflation 
was significantly below unity during the pre-Volcker period and significantly above unity in 
the later period. An inflation coefficient below unity corresponds to accommodative monetary 
policy as real interest rates decline in response to an inflation increase (see, for example, 
Clarida et al., 1998, 2000 or Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004). In other words, before 1979 US 
monetary policy does not comply with the Taylor principle. Characterization of monetary 
policy in the interim period, between 1979 and 1982, is difficult as it seems dominated by 
transition dynamics induced by the Fed's monetary experiment. Moreover, the Fed's policy 
response to economic slack also seems difficult to pin down. Orphanides (2003, 2004) goes as 
far as to argue that the key distinction does not involve the response to expected inflation, but 
rather the response to policymakers’ real-time perceptions of real activity (excess demand). 
Using real-time data to re-estimate the Fed’s policy rule, he finds that, prior to Volcker’s 
appointment, policy was too responsive to perceived output gaps.  Specifically, loose 
                                                 
36 See Beyer and Farmer (2007) for an econometric investigation and Gaspar et al. (2006) for an analytical 
narrative drawing on the documentary evidence provided in Lindsey et al.(2005).   30
monetary policy was a consequence of responding strongly to overestimations of economic 
slack. More recent papers (Boivin, 2006, Kim and Nelson, 2006, Partouche, 2007), using a 
time-varying coefficients framework, find important, but gradual changes in the Fed’s 
response to both inflation and real activity, not properly accounted for by the typical split-
sample approach. 
 
5.2. A comparison of empirically estimated policy rules 
 
As a starting point for a comparative analysis of German and US monetary policy reaction 
functions during the Great Inflation, it is useful to take another look at the relative inflation 
performance of the two countries from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. According to Figure 
5.1, the upsurge of inflation in Germany in the early 1970s was stopped by quick disinflation 
which preceded the Volcker disinflation by about six years. Still, the dating of the regime 
shift is not as straightforward for Germany as it is for the US, where the appointment of Paul 
Volcker as Chairman provides an obvious date for a structural break. Two potential 
candidates are the break down of the Bretton Woods System in March 1973 and/or the official 
start of the monetary targeting regime in 1975Q1.
37 However, most studies on the 
Bundesbank’s reaction function, including Clarida et al. (1998) and Gerberding, Seitz and 
Worms (2005, 2007), choose an even later date, namely  1979Q1, as the starting point of their 
analysis. The reason for doing so can best be understood by comparing the behaviour of real 
interest rates and inflation during the period in question.  
 
As shown in Figure 5.2, pre-1979 the US real rate steadily declines as inflation rises, 
becoming persistently negative during most of the seventies. In late 1979, the real rate rose 
sharply, leading to a subsequent decline in inflation. This observation provides the rationale 
for the analysis in Beyer and Farmer (2007). They argue that the source of the inflation build- 
up in the 1970s was a downward drift in the real interest rate that was translated into a 
simultaneous increase in unemployment and inflation by passive Fed policy. For Germany, 
the picture is different. Real interest rates rose sharply after the break-down of the Bretton 
Woods System in March 1973. Moreover, real interest rates were (almost) always 
significantly positive throughout the period. Nevertheless, the early increase in real interest 
rates was almost completely reversed in 1974/75 and the real rate was kept rather low until 
                                                 
37 The Bundesbank had already established an internal monetary target for its own orientation for the year 1974 
(see Dudler, 1980, p. 299), so 1974Q1 may be considered another potential breakpoint.     31
the beginning of 1979 (data: inflation measured by CPI inflation against previous quarter, real 
rates calculated by subtracting period t+1 inflation from three-month money market rates, 
three-quarter centered moving averages). Overall, however, the visual comparison between 
the conduct of monetary policy in Germany and the US in the 1970s suggests loose monetary 
policy in the latter country, but not in Germany. 
  
In the remainder of this section, our aim is to characterize differences in monetary policy in 
terms of differences in the estimated monetary policy reaction functions. In order to be better 
able to capture empirical regularities, we extend the interest rate rule derived in the previous 
section - Eq (4.18) - in two directions. First, the theoretical model of Section 4 was silent on 
the frequency of the data, but it is usually taken to describe regularities observed in quarterly 
data and in quarterly rates of change. However, when applying the model to the Bundesbank’s 
monetary policy, we have to take account of the fact that the Bundesbank’s money growth 
targets were annual targets which referred to money growth over the previous four quarters. 
Hence, in the empirical application of Eq (4.18), we extend the time horizon of the inflation 
and output growth variables to annual (four-quarter) rates of change. Secondly, we allow for 
forward-looking behaviour on part of the policymakers, that is, we allow them to focus on 
expected rather than current inflation. This modification of Eq (4.18) can be rationalised by 
lags in the transmission of monetary policy impulses which are not accounted for in the 
baseline New Keynesian model.
38 Thirdly, in order to capture interest rate dynamics not 
accounted for by the first lag of the interest rate, we also included the second lag of the 
interest rate among the endogenous variables. Hence, we start from a specification of the 
following form:  
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where  ) ( t
a
n t E Ω + π  is policymakers’ inflation forecast for period t+n formed in t on the basis 
of the information available at time t, π
a denotes annual inflation,  ) ) ((
*
t t t y y E Ω −  is 
policymakers’ estimate of the current output gap, again formed on the basis of information 
available at the time,  t u  is an error term and Δ4 denotes changes over the previous four 
                                                 
38 Strictly speaking, this argument is valid only for the part of the interest rate response to inflation which derives 
directly from the inflation stabilization objective in the loss function (4.8). Therefore, we also estimated   32
quarters. An important issue is the method used to generate the forecasts of inflation, the 
output gap and the output growth gap. Unfortunately, as regards the Bundesbank, real-time 
forecasts of these variables over the relevant time horizons and at the appropriate frequency 
do not exist. Therefore, we follow the method first proposed by McCallum (1976) and proxy 
the unobserved forecasts by the corresponding realizations (see Clarida et al., 1998). Hence, 
the error term ut is a linear combination of the forecast errors and the exogenous disturbance 
term. In order to keep the forecast errors as small as possible, we use the initial (unrevised) 
figures on inflation and output as well as the first available estimates of the output gap.
39 To 
avoid endogeneity problems, these variables are instrumented by a vector of variables It which 
were part of policymakers’ real-time information sets and which are orthogonal to the error 
term  t u  (for details on the instrument sets, see Table 5.1-5.3).
  
 
Finally, for empirical tractability, the model requires a sufficiently stable empirical money 
demand function. Reviewing the empirical literature on money demand we are confident that 
this condition is fulfilled as there is broad evidence for the existence of sufficiently stable 
cointegrated money demand models. In conventional cointegrated money demand models 
money is usually explained by output (e.g. GDP, serving as a scale variable), and one or more 
suitable interest rate variables that represent own rates and opportunity costs for holding 
money. Derivations of actual money from the long-run money demand relationship 
* () mm − are then interpreted as stationary (i.e. transitory) money demand shocks, 
corresponding to the level of  t ε  in (4.18). For example, Beyer (1998) finds a stable 
cointegrated long run money demand function for German M3 over the sample period 1975 – 
1994 with stationary money demand shocks. The standard deviation of their first differences 
is 4.6%, compared with a standard deviation of 3.5% for the year-on-year growth rate of 
money. Similarly, Baba et al.(1992) find a stable long-run money demand function for US 
M1 for the sample period 1960 – 1988 and likewise see Hendry and Ericsson (1991a) for UK 
M1 over the sample 1963-1989.
40 Hence we believe that the empirical model (5.1) is a valid 
approximation for empirically estimating our modified theoretical Taylor rule (4.18). 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
specifications of the interest rate reaction function which allow for a response to current as well as expected 
future inflation. However, not surprisingly, in these exercises one of the two terms usually drops out.    
39 See Gerberding et al. (2005), p. 279f..  
40 Using annual data Hendry and Ericsson (1991b) find a stable long-run money demand function for US M1 
over the sample period 1878-1970.    33
We first report our findings for Germany which are summarized in Table 5.1. The estimates 
are based on the real-time data set described in Gerberding et al. (2004). In order to compare 
the conduct of monetary policy in Germany before and after the collapse of Bretton Woods, 
the data set was extended backwards to 1965 so that it now covers the sample period 1965–
1998.
41 As formal tests for structural break do not yield unambiguous results, we present 
estimates for three different break points, with the Bretton Woods/Pre-Monetary Targeting 
samples ending in 1973Q1, 1974Q4 and 1978Q4, respectively. In Table 5.1, we only report 
results for a forward-looking specification of the reaction function where the horizon of the 
inflation forecast variable has been set to four quarters. However, in order to check the 
robustness of the results to changes in the horizon of the inflation variable, we conducted the 
exercise for different horizons of the inflation forecast, reaching from n=0 to n=4, and found 
that the results were qualitatively the same.
42 Our estimations also established that the term 
*
44 ()
md v
tt ε ε Δ− Δ does not play a major econometric role. In theory, this term is unobservable. 
Point estimates and standard errors of regressors in model (5.1) remain virtually unaffected 
whether an empirical proxy of that term is included or not. However, as part of a money 
demand shock this error variable has interesting policy implications which we will discuss 
further below (see 5.3).  
 
The analysis yields a number of interesting results. First, we find that the coefficient ß, which 
captures the interest rate response to inflation, is significantly below one before the 
introduction of monetary targeting (that is, for the sample periods 65Q1-73Q1 and 65Q1-
74Q4, respectively), but significantly above one afterwards (that is, for the samples starting in 
75Q1 and later). Note, however, that the standard error of the inflation coefficient and of the 
equation is lowest for the (arguably more stable) 1979-1998 period. From this, we conclude 
that the Bundesbank respected the Taylor principle (responded to a rise in (expected) inflation 
in a stabilizing way) right from the beginning of the monetary targeting regime. This contrasts 
with empirical estimates of standard Taylor rules for the US over the 1970s. Second, the 
response to the perceived output gap, γ1, is significantly positive with point estimates about 
0.5 in the Bretton Woods/pre-Monetary Targeting sub-samples. By contrast, it is close to zero 
                                                 
41 The first vintage of Bundesbank estimates of potential output that we were able to reconstruct dates from April 
1972 (Bundesbank, AR 1971). In order to go back beyond this date, we proxied the unavailable “true” real-
time data by the estimates dating from April 1972. We think this justifiable since there are no indications of 
major revisions during the time span 1965-1972. For instance, the estimates of the German output gap in the 
1960s published by the OECD in April 1970 (see OECD, 1970) are very similar to the estimates that we 
reconstructed from the April 1972 vintages of Bundesbank data  on actual and potential output. 
42 Results available from authors on request.   34
and insignificant under monetary targeting. If one follows Orphanides (2003), the lack of 
response to real-time estimates of the output gap, which at the time were heavily biased 
downwards in most countries, may also have been an important reason for Germany’s 
superior inflation performance after the regime shift. Thirdly, the coefficient on the output 
growth gap, which is insignificant before the introduction of monetary targeting, becomes 
highly significant afterwards. According to our theoretical model, this is an important feature 
which distinguishes the Bundesbank’s policy under monetary targeting from a purely 
discretionary approach. Hence, we interpret this result as evidence that the money growth 
targets did bring the Bundesbank policy closer to the (otherwise not feasible) optimal 
commitment solution. Fourthly, we find a significant degree of interest rate inertia, captured 
by ρ, in all sub-sample periods, with point estimates about 0.6 before and about 0.8 after the 
regime change. The high degree of inertia after the regime shift is in accordance with the 
predictions of the theoretical model as well as with the Bundesbank´s often professed 
preference for conducting policy with a steady hand (“Politik der ruhigen Hand”).
43  
 
Tables 5.2a and b present the results for a very similar formulation for the US. We use the 
three months T-Bill rate as a short term interest rate. Regarding the explanatory variables, 
inflation is again measured by year-on-year changes in CPI. For the output gap,  ) (
*
t t y y − , we 
use the real-time perceptions of the US output gap reconstructed by Orphanides (2003). We 
report results for annual changes in the output gap as well as for its quarterly changes. Notice, 
that for the US we normalize the inflation target  * π  at zero. For the forward-looking element, 
we use inflation expectations one period ahead that are formed at period t. In Table 5.2a, we 
use real-time inflation forecasts based on Greenbook data (as in Orphanides 2003, 2004), 
whereas in Table 5.2b, we use the lead of revised inflation data. For interest rate smoothing 
we restricted ourselves to reporting the case of one lag only
44.  
 
For analyzing the US we follow the strategy that is common in the empirical literature and 
estimate over samples that correspond to the chairmanships of Burns - Miller and Volcker - 
Greenspan. Using quarterly data we consider the period 1970Q1 – 1979Q2 (“the Burns-Miller 
                                                 
43 In Gerberding et al. (2007), we show that for the sample period 1979Q1 to 1998Q4, this result is robust to the 
inclusion of an AR(1)-model for the error term. 
44 We also estimated the models with two lags and got very similar quantitative and the same qualitative results 
compared to the one lag only specification.   35
period”) and the period 1983Q1 - 1998Q4 (“the Volcker-Greenspan period”). The omitted 
interim period is characterized by transitional dynamics and does not yield useful estimates.  
 
We are able to reproduce a number of well known findings. First, for real time inflation 
forecast data (see Tab. 5.2a) we can replicate Orphanides’ (2003) findings with a Taylor 
coefficient greater than unity also in the Burns-Miller period whereas for revised inflation 
data (Tab. 5.2b)  the Taylor coefficient on inflation is significantly below unity in the Burns-
Miller period and significantly above one in the Volcker-Greenspan period. Second, the 
coefficient on the lagged interest rate is much larger in the latter period (becoming close to 
one). Third, and focusing on formulation with the annual measure of the change in the output 
gap, the coefficient on the output gap is always significant, at the 5% level, except for the 
Volcker – Greenspan period in case of quarterly changes of the output gap (see Tab. 5.2b, 3rd 
row). Regarding the history dependence of monetary policy we find significant differences 
between the US and Germany. For the US the coefficients for both, quarterly or annual 
changes in the output gap is insignificant during the 1970s. Conversely, it is highly significant 
during the 1980s and 1990s whereas for Germany it is significant throughout the entire post-
Bretton Woods sample period. The comparison of the models for Germany and the US 
between Table 5.1 and Table 5.2a,b therefore suggests that the conduct of monetary policy in 
the US and Germany differed during the 1970s but after 1983, US monetary policy 
approached the practice that the Bundesbank followed since 1975.  
 
Turning to the case of UK, already from eyeballing Figures 2.1-3 one would expect, with 
respect to Germany but to a lesser extent also to the US, very different empirical results for 
any estimated Taylor rule. Compared to US and Germany inflation in UK peaked highest, 
interest rates during the 1970s were at a much higher level whereas growth performance was 
comparatively much weaker than in US or Germany. In order to explain the UK three-month 
T-bill rate, we use the real-time perceptions of the UK output gap reconstructed by Nelson 
and Nikolov (2003). For future inflation we use revised data, analogue to Table 5.2b for the 
US The results in Table 5.3 confirm our priors. Interest rates in the 1970s appear to follow a 
near-unit root process. Neither output nor inflation gap are remotely significant. This changes 
only later in the 1980s and 1990s, when the output gap remains insignificant but the Taylor 
coefficient on inflation is estimated rather tightly at 1.5.  
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5.3. The role of money demand shocks 
 
As pointed out in the previous subsection, dealing with the term  ) (
*
4 4
v
t
md
t ε ε Δ − Δ  has 
interesting policy implications. The term represents those (exogenous) changes in money 
demand that are not identified and accounted for by the central bank. Ignoring this term in the 
empirical model implies an assumption that the central bank – in our case the Bundesbank - 
did not make systematic mistakes in identifying shocks to money demand. Under this 
assumption, the variable ) (
*
4 4
v
t
md
t ε ε Δ − Δ  will be a white noise (or at least stationary) process 
which can be subsumed as, say,  t u %, into the error term of Eq (5.1). However, we are aware 
that our framework also has testable implications for the Bundesbank’s response to 
unidentified disturbances to money demand.
45 Specifically, we would expect to find that 
policy was tightened in response to an increase in this variable and vice versa. Unfortunately, 
since we do not have reliable information on the magnitude of the portfolio shocks observed 
by the Bundesbank, in real time, 
* v
t ε , we cannot test this hypothesis directly. However, as a 
robustness check, we conducted an alternative test which is based on the assumption that the 
Bundesbank was able to identify a fraction δ of the “true” money demand shock so that  
md
t
v
t δε ε =
* holds. Under this assumption, we can rewrite Eq (5.1) as:  
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where δ  denotes the fraction of the “true” money demand shock that the Bundesbank was 
able to identify. In the special case when  1 δ =  the Bundesbank could identify all shocks as 
portfolio shocks, whereas if  0 δ =  the shock to money demand remained unreduced. Using 
the residuals from the money demand model of Beyer (1998) to estimate Eq (5.1a), we find 
that the coefficient δ is highly significant, with a point estimate of 0.77.
46 On the other hand, 
the fact that our estimate of δ is also significantly different from one suggests that the 
Bundesbank did react to shocks to money demand which it was unable to identify in real time. 
Specifically, when money growth increased as a consequence of a non-identified disturbance 
to money demand, the Bundesbank would tighten policy, in contrast with what would be the 
case under perfect information. This empirical finding is in line with the testable implication 
                                                 
45 We thank our discussant Benjamin Friedman bringing this important point to our attention. . 
46 Results available from Andreas Beyer on request.    37
from the theoretical model presented in the previous section. Nevertheless, the relatively high 
value of δ suggests that the Bundesbank was able to identify most money demand 
disturbances in real time. Hence, it responded to such shocks  in a much muted way, thereby 
limiting the volatility of policy rates.  
 
5.4. Summary 
 
To sum up, the empirical results for Germany, US, and UK suggest that monetary policy in 
the three countries was conducted very differently in the 1970s. For Germany and US 
estimating a Taylor rule for that period produces reasonable results but reveals different 
policy strategies. Money as a commitment device has worked well for Germany and is 
reflected by a significant coefficient in changes of the output gap variable. For the US we do 
not find any similar history dependence in the data for the 1970s but we do find it for the 
Volcker-Greenspan period in the 1980s and 1990s. By sharp contrast, monetary policy in the 
UK has been very different both with respect to US and Germany. Our empirical findings do 
not allow for any Taylor-type characterization of UK monetary policy in the 1970s and only 
very vaguely for the 1980s and 1990s. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine an important episode in European monetary history. We investigate 
the conduct of monetary policy in Germany in the 1970s and the 1980s. It was during this 
period that the Bundesbank acquired its credibility and reputation as a bulwark against 
inflation. Our goal was to illustrate how the monetary growth targeting strategy, followed by 
the Bundesbank since 1975, contributed to this success. We wanted, as much as possible, to 
examine the strategy as conceived, communicated and refined by the Bundesbank itself. 
Naturally we are not able to do full justice to the Bundesbank's approach. We can only present 
a simplified (stylized) view of the conduct of monetary policy in that period. 
 
Nevertheless, we think that by focusing on anchoring inflation and inflation expectations, we 
capture a fundamental aspect of the interaction between monetary policy and the behavior of 
economic agents. Using a standard new Keynesian model and a modified loss function 
(incorporating money growth deviations) we are able to explain the role of money growth 
targeting as a commitment device. Under some mild conditions regarding the existence of a 
stable money demand function which are fulfilled at least for Germany for the time period 
under consideration, we are able to derive a role for money as a commitment device, succeeds 
even in the context of the new Keynesian model (in which money plays no active role).  
 
The operation of monetary growth targeting as a commitment device is compatible with target 
misses, even repeatedly. In the modified loss function framework monetary growth targeting 
is permanently relevant and imposes structure on the monetary policy reaction function. 
Nevertheless, given that monetary deviations from target have to be traded off against other 
arguments in the loss function frequent deviations from target cannot be excluded. In practice, 
the Bundesbank had to account for the determinants of observed deviations and explain how, 
in the end, it would deliver on the final goal of price level stability. 
 
A standard objection to monetary targeting is that it induces unwarranted volatility in policy 
rates in response to unidentified disturbances to money demand. In the context of our 
theoretical model it is the case that the central bank will tighten in response to non-observed 
positive shocks to money demand. Empirically, we find this to be the case for the 
Bundesbank. Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that  money demand was stable in 
Germany during the period. Moreover, the Bundesbank appears to have been able to take into   39
account most special factors in real time. Hence, the response of policy to money demand 
disturbances was much attenuated, limiting the relevance of this concern for the historical 
performance of the Bundesbank. 
 
Issing in his Stone Lecture (Issing et al., 2005) affirms: "The Bundesbank missed its target 
roughly half of the time … This does not mean, however, that the Bundesbank did not take 
monetary targets seriously. On the contrary, money growth targets were regarded as 
constituting the basis for a rules-oriented approach to monetary policy. Announcing a 
monetary target implied a commitment by the Bundesbank towards the public. Deviations of 
money growth from the target had always to be justified. Even if it is true that the reputation 
of the Bundesbank ultimately was achieved by its success in fulfilling its mandate to 
safeguard the stability of its currency, its final goal, current policy continuously had to be 
justified in the context of its pre-announced strategy. In this sense, the strategy contributed to 
the transparency, the accountability and the credibility of Bundesbank's policy."  
 
Using real-time data we find that an empirically estimated interest rate rule which closely 
approximates our theoretical framework describes well the kind of monetary policy, as it was 
conducted by the Bundesbank, in the period since 1975 until 1998. The main finding is that 
the Bundesbank response to the change in the output gap was highly significant. Such 
response is a characteristic of the conduct of monetary policy under commitment. It is also 
robust policy against problems in the measurement of the level of potential output in real 
time. Such response to the growth gap was not present in the reaction function of the Federal 
Reserve System during the Burns-Miller period. It does become significant, for the US, in the 
later Volcker-Greenspan period. We were able to characterize systematic monetary policy for 
Germany and the US. Our empirical findings suggest a much less stable approach in the UK. 
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Figure 2.2:  Average nominal interest rates in the 1970s 
Long term and short term interest rates: 1970-1980
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Figure 2.3:  Average inflation and real growth rates in the 1970s 
Trade-off between inflation and GDP growth: 1970-1980
DE
FR
CA
CH
IT
JP
UK
US
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Inflation rate
G
D
P
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
CA
CH
DE
FR
IT
JP
UK
US
 
   52
Table 3.1: Numerical inputs for the derivation of the money growth targets 
Average annual changes in % 
Expected change in  Period  
Medium-
term price 
assumption*  
Expected 
growth of 
potential 
output 
Capacity 
utilisation 
Trend 
velocity (-) 
Envisaged 
increase in 
money 
stock 
 
 
 
Target**
 
 
 
 
Sources 
1975  no explicit derivation by single factors  + 8  MR Dec. 74 
1976  + 4/+5  + 2
  + 2 ½   - 1  + 8    AR 76, MR 
Jan. 76 
1977  + 3 ½
1)/+ 4
2)  + 3 
  + 2  - 1  + 8  (6-7)
  AR 76, MR 
Jan. 77 
1978  + 3/+ 3 ½   + 3  +   +  8  (5-7)
  AR 77, MR 
Jan. 78 
1979 +  +  3  +  +   6-9  MR Jan. 79 
1980  + 4  + 3    - 1  (+ 6)  5-8  AR 79, MR 
Dec. 79 
1981  + 3 ½ /+ 4  + 2 ½     - 1  +5/+5 ½  4-7  AR 80, MR 
Dec. 80 
1982  + 3 ½ 
1)  + 1 ½ /+2    0 (+  4  ¾)  4-7  AR 81, MR 
Dec. 81 
1983  + 3 ½   + 1 ½ /+2       4-7  MR Dec. 82 
1984  + 3  + 2     +  5  4-6  AR 83, MR 
Dec. 83 
1985 +  2 Over  2 +    + 4 ½  3-5  MR Dec. 84 
1986 +  2
1)  + 2 ½       + 4 ½  3 ½ - 5 ½  MR Jan. 86 
1987  + 2  + 2 ½       3-6  MR Jan. 87 
1988  + 2  + 2    + ½     3-6  MR Feb. 88 
1989  + 2  + 2/+ 2 ½    + ½  5 about  5  MR Dec. 88 
1990  + 2  + 2 ½     + ½  about 5  4-6  MR Dec. 89 
1991
3)  + 2  + 2 ½  (+ 2 
¼)
3) 
  + ½   4-6  (3-5)
3)  AR 90, MR 
July 91 
1992  + 2  + 2 ¾     + ½    3 ½ -5 ½   MR Dec. 91 
1993  + 2  + 3    + 1  + 6  4 ½ -6 ½   MR Dec. 92 
1994  + 2  + 2 ½     + 1  + 5 ½  4-6  MR Jan. 94 
1995  + 2  + 2 ¾       + 1  + 5 ¾   4-6  MR Jan. 95 
1996  + 2  + 2 ½     + 1  + 5 ½   4-7  MR Jan. 96 
1997  + 1 ½ /+ 2  + 2 ¼     + 1  + 5  3 ½ -6 ½   MR Jan. 97 
1998  + 1 ½ /+ 2  + 2    + 1  + 5  3-6  MR Jan. 98 
*Before 1985: unavoidable increase in prices. **Targets referred to central bank money stock (defined as 
currency in circulation plus required minimum reserves on domestic deposits calculated at constant reserve ratios 
with base January 1974) until 1987 and the broad money stock M3 thereafter. 1) Explicit reference to GDP 
deflator; 2) Explicit reference to consumer price index. 3) Downward correction of target range in midyear 
review. 
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Table 3.2: Monetary targets and their implementation 
in % 
  Target:  
Growth of central bank money stock (1975-
1987) or money stock M3 (from 1988) 
 
Actual money growth 
 
Year  in the course 
of the year
1 
annual 
average 
midyear 
review 
in the 
course of 
the year 
annual 
average 
 
 
 
Target 
achieved 
 
 
 
Inflation rate 
(CPI)
4 
1975 8      10.1  (9.5)  7.8  no  5.9 
1976   8    (9.0)  9.2  no  4.2 
1977 (6-7)
2 8    (9.5)  9.0  no  3.8 
1978 (5-7)
2 8    (12.1)  11.4  no  2.7 
1979 6-9    lower  limit  6.3  9.1  yes  4.1 
1980 5-8  (6)  lower  half  4.9  4.8  yes  5.4 
1981 4-7  (5-5  ½)  lower  half  3.5  4.4  yes  6.3 
1982 4-7 (4  ¾)  Upper  half  6.0  4.9  yes  5.3 
1983 4-7    Upper  half  7.0  7.3  yes  3.4 
1984 4-6  (5)    4.6  4.8  yes  2.3 
1985  3-5  (4 ½)     4.5  4.6  yes  2.2 
1986  3 ½ - 5 ½  (4 ½)     7.7  6.4  no  -0.2 
1987 3-6      8.1  8.1  no  0.3 
1988 3-6      6.7  6.3  no  1.2 
1989  about 5  (just under 5)    4.7  5.7  yes  2.8 
1990 4-6  (about  5)    5.6  4.3  yes  2.7 
1991
  4-6  (5/5 ¼)   3-5  5.2  4.6  yes  3.6 
1992  3 ½- 5 ½  (5-5 ¼)     9.4  8.1  no  4.0  
1993  4 ½ - 6 ½   (6)    7.4  7.8  no  3.6  
1994  4-6  (5 ½)     5.7  9.0  yes  2.7  
1995  4-6  (5 ¾)     2.1  0.6  no  1.8 
1996  4-7  (5 ½)     8.1  7.5  no  1.4 
1997
3  3 ½- 6 ½      4.7  6.2  yes  1.9 
1998
3  3-6     5.5  4.4  yes  1.0 
Mean      6.6  6.5  3.0 
1 Between the fourth quarter of the previous year and the fourth quarter of the current year; 1975: Dec. 1974 to 
Dec. 1975. – 2 According to Annual Reports for 1977 and 1978. – 3 Embedded in a two-year orientation for 
1997/1998 of about 5% per year. – 4 From 1995, all-German figures. 
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Figure 3.1: Money Growth Targets 1975-1998 
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Figure 5.1: Inflation in Germany and the US (consumer prices, quarterly data) 
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Figure 5.2a: Interest Rates and Inflation in Germany  
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Figure 5.2b: Interest Rates and Inflation in the US  
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Table 5.1: Estimates of the extended reaction function, inflation forward-looking (from t 
to t+4), change in output gap from t-4 to t, real-time data  
Estimation equation: 
t t t
t t t
t t t t
a
t
t u i i
y y E
y y E ßE
i + + +
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
Ω − Δ +
Ω − + Ω +
− − = − −
+
2 2 1 1 *
4 2
*
1 4
2 1
) ) ( (
) ) (( ) (
) 1 ( ρ ρ
γ
γ π α
ρ ρ  
 
  ß  γ1 
 
γ2  ρ1  ρ2  2 R   SEE J-stat  (p-
values) 
Germany’s “Great” Inflation  
1965Q1-73Q1 0.52*** 
(0.09) 
0.44*** 
(0.08) 
- 
 
0.72*** 
(0.07) 
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.71 1.09 0.64 
1965Q1-74Q4 0.69*** 
(0.15) 
0.51*** 
(0.13) 
- 
 
0.72*** 
(0.12) 
-0.17* 
(0.09) 
0.76 1.41 0.55 
1965Q1-78Q4 1.05*** 
(0.24) 
0.52*** 
(0.07) 
- 
 
0.62*** 
(0.14) 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
0.81 1.21 0.79 
Post-Bretton Woods/Monetary Targeting  
1973Q2-98Q4 0.82*** 
(0.30) 
0.58** 
(0.25) 
1.39** 
(0.66) 
1.02*** 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
0.92 0.81 0.63 
1975Q1-98Q4 1.70*** 
(0.22) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
0.75*** 
(0.23) 
1.05*** 
(0.06) 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
0.92 0.69 0.59 
1979Q1-98Q4 1.89*** 
(0.19) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
0.74*** 
(0.24) 
0.98*** 
(0.07) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
0.94 0.64 0.89 
***(**/*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%/10%) level; estimation method: GMM; HAC-robust standard 
errors in parentheses. R²: adjusted coefficient of determination; SEE: standard error of the regression; J-stat: p-
value of the J-statistic on the validity of overidentifying restrictions. 
Variables: left-hand-side variable: 3-month money market rate (end-of-quarter); right-hand-side variables: 
inflation gap according to CPI; output gap with Bundesbank's own estimates of production potential. For further 
details on the data see Gerberding et al. (2004).  
The instrument set includes contemporary values of the inflation variable (CPI over previous year in %) and a 
commodity price variable (change of HWWA index of commodity prices in D-Mark over previous quarter in %) 
as well as up to three lags of each explanatory variable, the commodity price variable and a money growth 
variable (change in the Bundesbank’s respective monetary target variable over previous year in %). Pretesting 
suggests that this instrument structure is sufficient. 
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Table 5.2a: The US. Estimates of the extended reaction function, inflation forward-
looking y-o-y (from t-3 to t+1) using real-time inflation forecast  
 
Estimation equation: 
( ) t t t t t j t t t t t t
a
t t t u i y y E y y E ßE i + + Ω − Δ + Ω − + Ω + − = − + 1 1
*
2
*
1 1 1 ) ) ( ( ) ) (( ) ( ) 1 ( ρ γ γ π α ρ
 
 
  ß  γ1 
 
γ2  ρ1  Const  2 R   SEE J-stat 
(11dof) 
(p-
values) 
1970Q1-
1979Q2   
j=1 
1.100*** 
(0.114) 
 
0.367*** 
(0.072) 
0.064 
(0.053) 
0.592*** 
(0.098) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.86 0.006  0.11*34 
(>10%) 
 
1970Q1-
1979Q2   
j=4 
1.023*** 
(0.128) 
0.390*** 
(0.098) 
-0.013 
(0.026) 
0.545*** 
(0.109) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.87 0.006  0.15*34 
(>10%) 
 
1983Q1-
1998Q4 
j=1 
3.499*** 
(1.150) 
0.926*** 
(0.418) 
0.512*** 
(0.183) 
0.912*** 
(0.028) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.93 0.004  0.15*60 
(>10%) 
1983Q1-
1998Q4 
j=4 
2.721*** 
(0.609) 
0.458*** 
(0.161) 
0.122*** 
(0.035) 
0.89*** 
(0.029) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.96 0.003  0.17*60 
(>10%) 
***(**/*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%/10%) level; estimation method: GMM; HAC-robust standard 
errors in parentheses. R²: adjusted coefficient of determination; SEE: standard error of the regression; J-stat: p-
value of the J-statistic on the validity of overidentifying restrictions. 
Variables: left-hand-side variable: 3-month T-Bill rate; right-hand-side variables: Greenbook inflation forecasts 
(y-o-y CPI); output gap; and y-o-y changes in the output gap. For further details on the output gap data see 
Orphanides (2003), p. 996ff.  
The instrument set includes up to 3 lags of  ,, ( * ) ix x π − . Extending the set by including changes of 
commodity prices as well as three lags of nominal money growth M2 (y-o-y) does not change the results 
qualitatively.  
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Table 5.2b: The US. Estimates of the extended reaction function, inflation forward-
looking y-o-y (from t-3 to t+1)  
 
Estimation equation: 
( ) t t t t t j t t t t t t
a
t t t u i y y E y y E ßE i + + Ω − Δ + Ω − + Ω + − = − + 1 1
*
2
*
1 1 1 ) ) ( ( ) ) (( ) ( ) 1 ( ρ γ γ π α ρ
 
 
  ß  γ1 
 
γ2  ρ1  Const  2 R   SEE J-stat 
(11dof) 
(p-
values) 
1970Q1-
1979Q2   
j=1 
0.619*** 
(0.030) 
 
0.195*** 
(0.040) 
0.095 
(0.059) 
0.458*** 
(0.064) 
0.018*** 
(0.001) 
0.87 0.006  0.22*34 
(>10%) 
 
1970Q1-
1979Q2   
j=4 
0.591*** 
(0.033) 
0.206** 
(0.084) 
0.014 
(0.028) 
0.493*** 
(0.108) 
0.018*** 
(0.002) 
0.86 0.006  0.22*34 
(>10%) 
 
1983Q1-
1998Q4 
j=1 
2.73* 
(1.506) 
1.406 
(1.035) 
0.419*** 
(0.076) 
0.960*** 
(0.025) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.94 0.004  0.15*60 
(>10%) 
1983Q1-
1998Q4 
j=4 
2.040*** 
(0.540) 
0.475** 
(0.221) 
0.149*** 
(0.027) 
0.89*** 
(0.029) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.96 0.003  0.17*60 
(>10%) 
***(**/*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%/10%) level; estimation method: GMM; HAC-robust standard 
errors in parentheses. R²: adjusted coefficient of determination; SEE: standard error of the regression; J-stat: p-
value of the J-statistic on the validity of overidentifying restrictions. 
Variables: left-hand-side variable: 3-month T-Bill rate; right-hand-side variables: inflation (y-o-y CPI); output 
gap; and y-o-y changes in the output gap. For further details on the output gap data see Orphanides (2003), p. 
996ff.  
The instrument set includes up to 3 lags of  ,, ( * ) ix x π − . Likeweise, as for the model in Table 5.2a extending 
the set of instruments by including changes of commodity prices as well as three lags of nominal money growth 
M2 (y-o-y) does not change the results qualitatively. .,  
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Table 5.3: The UK. Estimates of the extended reaction function, inflation forward-
looking y-o-y (from t-3 to t+1)  
 
Estimation equation: 
( ) t t t t t j t t t t t t
a
t t t u i y y E y y E ßE i + + Ω − Δ + Ω − + Ω + − = − + 1 1
*
2
*
1 1 1 ) ) ( ( ) ) (( ) ( ) 1 ( ρ γ γ π α ρ
 
 
  ß  γ1 
 
γ2  ρ1  Const  2 R   SEE J-stat 
(11dof) 
(p-
values) 
1970Q1-
1979Q2   
j=1 
-0.10 
(0.463) 
 
0.007 
(0.34) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.869*** 
(0.10) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.73 0.015  0.24*35 
(>10%) 
 
1970Q1-
1979Q2   
j=4 
0.058 
(0.33) 
-0.02 
(0.37) 
0.07 
(0.083) 
0.827*** 
(0.081) 
0.016** 
(0.006) 
0.74 0.014  0.23*35 
(>10%) 
 
1983Q1-
1996Q1 
j=1 
1.531*** 
(0.14) 
-0.32 
(0.28) 
-0.09 
(0.095) 
0.70*** 
(0.071) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.92 0.0078  0.16*53 
(>10%) 
1983Q1-
1996Q1 
j=4 
1.526*** 
(0.156) 
-0.20 
(0.299) 
-0.02 
(0.081) 
0.72*** 
(0.069) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.92 0.0079  0.16*53 
(>10%) 
***(**/*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%/10%) level; estimation method: GMM; HAC-robust standard 
errors in parentheses. R²: adjusted coefficient of determination; SEE: standard error of the regression; J-stat: p-
value of the J-statistic on the validity of overidentifying restrictions. 
Variables: left-hand-side variable: 3-month T-Bill rate; right-hand-side variables: inflation (y-o-y CPI); output 
gap; and y-o-y changes in the output gap. For further details on the output gap data see Nelson and Nikolov 
(2003).  
The instrument set includes up to 3 lags of  ,, ( * ) ix x π − , and changes of commodity prices as well as three 
lags of nominal money growth “money + quasi-money” (y-o-y).  
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